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T h el i v e l i h o o d sa n df o o ds e c u r i t yo fm a n yC a m b o d i a n sd e p e n dh e a v i l yo ni n l a n d
c a p t u r ef i s h e r i e s ,s ot h es u s t a i n a b l em a n a g e m e n to ft h e s ef i s h e r i e si sv e r yi m p o r t a n t .
N o t w i th s t an d i n g ,th es u s t ai n a b i l i t yo fM e k o n gfi s h e ri e si sthr e a t e n e db yi n c r e a s i n gfi s hi n g
pressure and habitat modifications. Current management is considered insufficiently
capable of controlling levels of exploitation and achieving equitable distribution of the
resource, and the Cambodian government is promoting co-management initiatives as
a way of addressing these issues. Using an institutional analysis approach, the current
p e r f o r m a n c eo fc o - m a n a g e m e n ti naM e k o n gm a i n s t r e a mf i s h e r yw a sa s s e s s e d ,a n d
f a c t o r sl i m i t i n gs u c c e s si d e n t i f i e d .R e s u l t ss u g g e s tt h a tp e r f o r m a n c ea n ds u s t a i n a b i l i t yo f
c o - m a n a g e m e n ta r ec u r r e n t l yc o n s t r a i n e db yal a c ko fc l e a r l yd e f i n e dp r o p e r t yr i g h t sa n d
resource boundaries, a mismatch between resource scale and management initiatives, and
an absence of enabling legislation. Furthermore, objectives for management differ between
s t a k e h o l d e r sa n da r en o tw e l ld e f i n e do v e r a l l .W h i l ee n a b l i n gl e g i s l a t i o nd u et oc o m ei n t o
e f f e c ts h o r t l yi se x p e c t e dt oi m p r o v ep e r f o r m a n c ea n ds u s t a i n a b i l i t yo fc o - m a n a g e m e n t ,
boundary and scale issues will continue to pose challenges to co-management in open
systems such as the Mekong mainstream. As a result, calls for innovative solutions, such as
a federation of co-management schemes, will continue. In addition, increasing dependence
on fishing, and external threats to resources need to be addressed if sustainability is to be
improved.
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Introduction
I
nland fisheries in developing countries currently face a number of 
threats to their sustainability. Population growth and increasing 
dependence on fisheries have increased fishing pressure, while changes 
to habitat have reduced productivity. Management in many countries is 
considered incapable of controlling exploitation levels, particularly in 
open-access fisheries. In Cambodia, a developing country where inland 
fisheries are of enormous importance, co-management is being introduced 
into small-scale fisheries. This is being done in an attempt to improve 
governance, and ensure more equitable and sustainable allocation of the 
resource. The objective of this paper is to present an assessment of one such 
fishery; management performance and current constraints to successful 
co-management are examined, and the implications of the findings for the 
development of co-management in Cambodia are discussed.
Inland fisheries in Cambodia are currently managed under a regime 
whereby the state holds the property rights, although in practice many are 
effectively open-access. However, top-down governance is not considered 
to provide food and income security (particularly for the rural poor who 
depend heavily on subsistence fishing), and, consequently, efforts to 
improve management have been proposed. Co-management is but one of a 
number of approaches that could be taken to improve management; others 
are stricter top-down governance, and the assigning of communal or private 
property rights. Generally, co-management can exist within any property 
rights regime – the term co-management pertaining to ownership of rights 
to make decisions about use of the resource, rather than ownership of the 
actual resource (Jentoft et al. 1998). Co-management has been increasingly 
accepted over the last ten years as an appropriate way of improving fisheries 
management in developing countries, reflecting a growing trend towards 
decentralized natural resource management (Ribot 2002).
The main argument for co-management is that it can result in more efficient 
management, while allowing greater involvement of resource users in 
management decisions. Co-management is generally considered to be 
more democratic (Nielsen et al. 2004), have lower transaction costs (Hanna 
1995), and possibly be more sustainable than top-down management, due to 
better communication and less conflict amongst participating stakeholders 
(Jentoft 2005). Co-management covers a wide range of possible management 
strategies that have been classified in a number of ways, including on the 
basis of the relative roles of government and resource users (Jentoft and 
McCay 1995, Sen and Nielsen 1996, Nielsen and Vedsmand 1999), and 
on the basis of the emphasis placed on aspects of democracy or efficacy 
(Nielsen et al. 2004).
1                                                                                                                                                                           
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In Cambodia, co-management is being implemented through the creation 
of community fisheries; these involve management partnerships between 
a community of local resource users and the provincial office of fisheries 
(POF), usually supported by a non-governmental organization (NGO). 
While a number of policy reforms designed to support co-management 
have been made, the extent and success with which these reforms have 
been implemented at the local level is not yet well understood, and there are 
few documented cases of co-management in Cambodia (Try 2003, Oxfam 
2003). This research provides a detailed assessment of current performance 
in one community fishery. The fishery is located in the upstream Mekong 
province of Stung Treng, where riverine fisheries have traditionally been 
open-access. Fieldwork was conducted in June and July 2004, and consisted 
predominantly of interviews with community members and external 
stakeholders. An institutional analysis research framework was used to 
characterize components of the fishery and to assess current management 
performance. Since this fishery is fairly typical, broader conclusions can be 
drawn about fishery co-management for Cambodia in general.
Section 2 of this paper describes the context of the research, detailing the 
background and management of Cambodian fisheries and the case study 
community fishery. Section 3 provides an over-view of the research methods 
used. Section 4 discusses co-management performance and the reasons 
behind current outcomes. Policy implications and recommendations for 
improving fisheries co-management in Cambodia are discussed in section 5, 
and the conclusions are presented in section 6.                                                                                                                                                                           
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I
nland fisheries represent one of Cambodia’s most valuable natural 
resources. In total, the annual yield from inland capture fisheries is 
estimated to be at least 300,000–400,000 tonnes, with an estimated 
value of US$150–200 million (Degen et al. 2000). The importance of 
fisheries is probably underestimated by the official statistics, as they exclude 
subsistence production. Furthermore, it has been suggested that actual 
production is much higher (estimates ranging from 2.6 to 21 times higher) 
than official statistics suggest (Coates 2002); if correct, this would make the 
fisheries even more important. Regardless of the exact value, it is evident 
that freshwater capture fisheries make a major contribution to national food 
security and social and economic wellbeing. Many Cambodians, particularly 
the rural poor, rely heavily for their nutrition and livelihood on fisheries. On 
average, fresh and processed fish make up 75% of the dietary animal protein 
intake in Cambodia (Helmers and Kenefick 1999, cited in Degen et al. 
2000), though this proportion is likely to be significantly higher in fishing-
dependent communities (Ahmed et al. 1998). Inland fisheries in Cambodia 
are principally dependant on the Mekong River system, and are located 
along the Mekong, Sekong, Basac and Tonle Sap rivers and tributaries, and 
the Tonle Sap Lake. While commercial fishers operate on the Lake and in 
downstream areas, only subsistence fishers are supported by the small-scale 
fisheries in the upstream portion of the Mekong River.
Partly as a result of the annual flood pulse in the Mekong River, the Mekong 
River Basin has extremely high productivity and freshwater fauna diversity. 
Over 1200 fish species have been recorded (Sverdrup-Jensen 2002), around 
120 of which are commercially traded (Coates et al. 2003). Water flow 
within the Mekong River Basin shows extreme variation throughout the year, 
reflecting the wide fluctuations in rainfall between the monsoon season 
(May to October) and other times of the year. At peak flow, in August and 
September, the river carries around 30 times as much water as it does in 
March and April; this results in an inundation of floodplain forests. Most 
significantly, a fast rise in water volume in the Mekong causes the Tonle 
Sap River (which usually flows from the great lake into the Mekong) to 
reverse its flow, expanding the area of the lake by 4–6 times (van Zalinge et 
al. 1999). Flooding is associated with the seasonal migration of fish between 
dry-season habitats and spawning grounds (permanent channels and deep 
pools), and wet-season feeding grounds (floodplain forest). Additionally, 
many Mekong fish species make extensive longitudinal migrations between 
upland spawning grounds in Northern Cambodia/Lao and feeding grounds 
in the lowland floodplains.
Inland ﬁsheries in Cambodia 2                                                                                                                                                                           
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Numerous natural deep-water pools in upstream sections of the Mekong 
River have been recognized as extremely important to the ecology and 
life-cycles of both migratory and non-migratory fish species (Poulsen et 
al. 2002, Baird et al. 2001, Chea and Sean 2000), and there are known to 
be at least 100 deep pools in the Cambodian section of the river (Poulsen et 
al. 2002). Wide fluctuations in water levels in the Mekong River mean that 
dry-season refuges provide particularly important protection from predators, 
and cooler areas of water during the hottest months (Baird 2004). Deep 
pools are also used as spawning sites for many migratory species, the larvae 
and juveniles of which move downstream to floodplain areas in southern 
Cambodia and Vietnam and into the Tonle Sap Lake (Poulsen et al. 2002). 
They may thereby play a critical role in sustaining much of the country’s 
inland fisheries. Furthermore, there is some suggestion that protection of 
deep pools in the Mekong mainstream may increase stocks of certain fish 
species (Baird 1999).
Exploitation of fish stocks is increasing, due mainly to population growth 
and increasing dependence on fisheries. Although overall catch in the Tonle 
Sap area is probably still increasing over time, individual catches have fallen 
(van Zalinge 2003, MRC 2003). Importantly, catch composition is changing, 
with a decline in larger, slower-growing (and economically very important) 
species, but little change in smaller early-spawning species. Change in 
catch composition such as this is a classic indicator of a fishery under 
heavy exploitation, and there is some indication that selective over-fishing 
of slower-growing species (the ‘fishing-down’ process) is occurring (MRC 
2003). 
The use of illegal fishing gear, such as electro-fishing, fishing with 
explosives (dynamite fishing) and with insecticide poison, has been fairly 
widespread and poorly monitored. Illegal fishing has been particularly 
widespread in Stung Treng province; estimates suggest there were at 
least 8000 incidences of fishing with explosives every year between 1993 
and 1997 (Try 2003). Illegal fishing methods produce extremely high 
catches (respondents interviewed in this research reported that electro-
fishing typically yields 30–40 kg/day), thereby increasing pressure on the 
fishery, and potential pressure on the ecosystem, including disruption of 
spawning and pollution. The use of illegal nets, including large mesh nets 
and mosquito nets, can also damage fish stocks by targeting the largest 
(mega-spawning) and smallest (pre-recruit) fish in the fishery (Chea 
1999). Additionally, exploitation of critical habitats such as deep pools can 
have a disproportionate impact on the fishery, and there is some concern CHAPTER 2 | Inland ﬁsheries in Cambodia 5
                                                                                                                                                                           
that fishing in deep pools is contributing to stock depletion. In acting as 
dry season habitats and spawning grounds, deep pools constitute highly 
productive but vulnerable areas, particularly in the dry season. 
Loss of floodplain forest, due mainly to agricultural expansion and illegal 
logging, has reduced the area of wet season lakes, thereby decreasing the 
potential for fish production. The main reasons behind this loss of habitat 
and deforestation are an increasing population, weak land tenure and a lack 
of alternative employment opportunities (van Zalinge et al. 1999). Similarly, 
upstream developments, such as dams and water abstractions, have reduced 
water levels in the Mekong and, therefore, the potential for fish production. 
The construction of dams and reservoirs along the Mekong has also led to 
fragmentation of aquatic habitats and obstruction of migration routes.
Management of fisheries in Cambodia
Management of all fisheries in Cambodia is the responsibility of the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF), administered 
through the Department of Fisheries (DOF). Within the DOF, the 
community fisheries development office (CFDO) is responsible for 
facilitating the establishment of community fisheries. National fisheries 
policy focuses on sustaining the catch from inland fisheries, the main 
concern being to manage and conserve natural aquatic resources in order to 
supply sufficient food for all people (Sem et al. 2003).
The current primary legal framework for fisheries in Cambodia is 
the Fisheries-Fiat law, which classifies all permanent and temporary 
waterbodies as the property of the state (Gumm 2000). Under the current 
law, inland capture fisheries are divided into three categories—large, 
medium and small-scale fisheries. Large-scale fisheries (fishing lots) are 
differentiated from other fisheries by being limited-access and licensed. 
Currently, medium and family-scale fisheries are unlicensed and open-
access, but differentiated by gear type and dimensions. In general, small-
scale gear is used by subsistence fishers, while medium-scale gear is used 
by commercial operators.
In 2001, in response to growing conflict amongst stakeholders and to 
the food security needs of subsistence fishers, a number of reforms were 
made to the fisheries sector (Levinson 2002). A considerable proportion 
of sites reserved as fishing lots were released (in an attempt to address 
inequality of access to fishing grounds), and the establishment of small-                                                                                                                                                                           
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scale community fisheries, in both open-access and former ‘lot’ areas, was 
encouraged. The Fisheries-Fiat law is currently under revision, and a new 
law is awaiting ratification. The new law will define the framework for 
management, development and conservation of fisheries resources, with 
sustainable management of socioeconomic and environmental factors 
as a main objective (Felsing 2004). A new sub-decree that will provide 
the legal framework for community fisheries is also awaiting ratification. 
This will allow community fisheries to establish their own rules and 
regulations relating to seasonal and gear restrictions. Regulations must not 
permit activities disallowed by the national fisheries law, but can be more 
restrictive (Felsing 2004).
Despite the delay in approval of the sub-decree, numerous community 
fisheries have already been established as part of the fisheries reforms. 
Additionally, other initiatives introduced by NGOs before the fisheries 
reform program came into effect are now recognized as community 
fisheries by the CFDO. However, although community fisheries are 
officially recognized, they do not currently have any legal right to create 
new laws. Rather, rules created by the community fishery tend to mirror 
existing national laws (previously, poorly enforced), and are backed up by 
voluntary agreements between members.
7EORQJ.ODYLOODJHFRPPXQLW\ILVKHU\
To investigate the success of co-management in addressing threats to 
sustainability, a recently established community fishery in the upstream 
Mekong River, Stung Treng province, was selected as a case study (see 
Figure 1). Within Stung Treng province there are currently 51 community 
fisheries, all supported by an NGO partner. Community fisheries were first 
set up in the province in 1998, and consequently are at a more advanced 
stage of implementation than those in many other areas. The community 
fishery of Tblong Kla village was selected as a case study because it 
was of a size and nature to represent co-management arrangements in 
riverine small-scale fisheries.1 Tblong Kla village is located in Ou Mreah 
commune, Siem Bouk district, approximately 55 km south of the provincial 
capital town Stung Treng. Interviews were conducted with a number of 
village members, key people, and external stakeholders in order to gain an 
understanding of the interaction between the community and the fishery. 
The research method used is detailed in section 3.
1   The WorldFish Center is currently conducting research at a number of sites in Cambodia—Siem Reap, Stung Treng and Takeo 
provinces—where co-management is being introduced under the project ‘Aquatic Resources Valuation and Policies for 
Poverty Elimination in the Lower Mekong Basin’. CHAPTER 2 | Inland ﬁsheries in Cambodia 7
                                                                                                                                                                           
The village is made up of 138 households, with a total population of 690 
people. The community is fairly homogenous in structure; all households 
(both rich and poor) are dependent on subsistence fishing and rice farming 
for livelihoods, and are of similar ethnic origin and religion. Fishing 
represents the main income-generating activity in the village, as distance 
from the provincial capital limits access to markets for the sale of other 
goods, such as crops.
Tblong Kla village fishery consists of a 10-km stretch of the Mekong 
River that borders the village. Boundaries to the fishery are defined by the 
administrative boundaries of the village, but are not visibly marked in any 
way, and are only well known to community members. Currently, access 
to the fishery is restricted only by gear type, and the fishery is open to all. 
In addition to Tblong Kla villagers, the fishery is used by inhabitants of 
Figure 1. Map of Cambodia                                                                                                                                                                           
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the three other villages making up Ou Mreah commune, and by ‘outsiders’ 
(fishers from outside of the commune). Generally, most fishers from Tblong 
Kla fish within the confines of the community fishery or commune fishing 
grounds, as Figure 2 illustrates.
Figure 2. Proportion of households which fish within the village, commune and other areas
Source: WorldFish household survey (2004); Base: 30 respondents
Co-management was first introduced in 1998, when Oxfam Community 
Aid Abroad (OCAA), as part of a wider rural development project within 
the village, helped set up a community fishery. At the resource user level, 
the community fishery is represented by the community fishery committee 
(CFC), which provides a link between the government partner (the 
Provincial Office of Fisheries or POF) and the community. Rules prohibiting 
both illegal gear and fishing in a deep pool conservation area were created, 
and are jointly enforced by the community and the POF. (Although national 
law protecting deep pools existed previously, it was not widely known and 
seldom enforced.) New rules are created at meetings involving the entire 
community; the last such meeting took place approximately two years ago. 
The CFC has regular meetings with POF and OCAA representatives; these 
are typically held every 3-6 months.
Most fishers in the village use non-motorized boats to fish. Gill nets, cast 
nets and hooked long lines are used in the dry season, while bamboo traps 
including chan, lop and sayoeun are used in the wet season. A wide variety 
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of fish are caught in the fishery, although there is some seasonal variation 
due to the migratory nature of certain species. The species caught most 
commonly in the dry and wet seasons (and therefore representing the 
majority of catches), along with typical migration patterns are detailed in 
Table 1. Average catches (Table 2) vary little amongst community members, 
ranging between 1.3 and 2.5 kg/day, with the higher catches in the dry 
season (December–April), when fishers spend more time fishing and fish 
are easier to catch due to low water levels. Although community members 
all catch similar amounts, outsiders are considered to use substantially more 
gear and consequently obtain larger catches.
Post-harvest uses of fish catches are detailed in Figure 3 and include 
household consumption, sale to a commercial fish trader and processing into 
preserved fish sauce (prohoc) or paste (praok). Most commonly, fish catches 
are for household consumption, with a smaller portion being sold. However, 
post-harvest use is partly dependent on fish species. Trey Khya and Trey 
Kes are always sold fresh because they command a higher price than other 
species, while Trey Riel is only caught for household use, most commonly 
to make prohoc.
Table 2. Amount of fish caught per day in the dry and wet seasonsa
Catch amount
Number of households
Dry season (Dec-April) Wet season (May-Nov)
0.5 kg 2 5
1 kg 2 4
1.5 kg 3 5
2 kg 3 2
3 kg 4 2
5+ kg 4 -
Average catch 2.5 kg 1.3 kg
a Although one would generally expect estimated catch amounts reported by subsistence ﬁshers to be over-estimated, all ﬁsh 
sold to the ﬁsh trader in Tblong Kla is weighed; thus, ﬁshers have quite a good perception of catch weights. Base: 18 interviews 
with ﬁshing householdsCHAPTER 2 | Inland ﬁsheries in Cambodia 11
                                                                                                                                                                           
Figure 3. Post-harvest uses of fish catches: Thickness and direction of arrows indicate the 
relative uses of each type
Base: 18 interviews with ﬁshing households
Having discussed inland fisheries and fisheries management in Cambodia 
in general, as well as the characteristics of the community and fishery of 
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Theory and methods used 3
Institutional analysis research framework 
A
n institutional analysis research framework is used to identify and 
examine key factors affecting the organization and outcomes of 
co-management in the Tblong Kla community fishery. Several 
institutional analysis frameworks have been developed to assess co-
management arrangements for natural resources (Oakerson 1992, Pomeroy 
and Williams 1994). The framework used in this research (Figure 
4) was developed by Oakerson (1992), and adapted by the fisheries 
co-management research project (ICLARM IFM 1998) to specifically 
analyze co-management arrangements in fisheries. This framework 
provides a structured approach to examining and documenting the origin, 
current status, operation and performance of fisheries co-management 
arrangements, and has been used to analyze many co-management 
arrangements, including small-scale fisheries in Asia (Pomeroy et al. 2001). 
Consequently, it was considered the most appropriate tool for this empirical 
research. 
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Co-management arrangements require a certain level of cooperation and 
participation amongst partners; because of this, management performance 
is highly dependent on the actions and interactions of the resource user 
community and on the fishery and the institutional arrangements in place. 
In the context of natural resource management, institutional arrangements 
can be thought of as the set of rights and rules that govern the provision and 
appropriation of a resource by users and other stakeholders (Crawford and 
Ostrom 1995). The successful functioning of an institution is determined 
by whether or not the rules can be enforced, by the cost of enforcement 
and by the effectiveness of sanctions. These factors affect the incentive 
for individuals to behave in accordance (or discordance) with the rules. 
Institutional analysis provides the framework for assessment of management 
performance; by separating institutional arrangements from the strategies 
of resource users in individual decision-making situations, relationships 
between variables and outcomes of management can be examined (Ostrom 
et al. 1994). 
In this research, institutional analysis was carried out at the ‘micro’ or 
village level. Current management performance and differences between 
the current (co-management) and previous (open-access) situations were 
assessed. The framework was used as a diagnostic tool by working 
backwards, starting with the outcomes of management. The patterns 
of interaction between variables that result in these outcomes, and the 
incentives shaping these actions and interactions were then examined. 
Research focused predominantly on the impacts of co-management on local 
stakeholders (subsistence fishers). Performance was assessed in terms of 
perceived outcomes, as this is the information available to resource users 
that affects their subsequent actions. Outcomes were considered both in 
terms of specific performance measures [efficiency (Oakerson 1992), equity 
and sustainability (Hanna 1995)], and the degree to which stakeholder 
objectives are being met.
The institutional analysis relied on both primary data collection and 
examination of existing data. Primary data collection consisted of 
qualitative in-depth interviews with individuals or small groups of 
community members, key people and external stakeholders. Visualization 
techniques commonly used in participatory rural appraisal (PRA) or rapid 
rural appraisal (RRA), including wealth-ranking, mapping and matrix-
scoring, were used in interviews with community members [see Chambers 
(1997) for a discussion of these techniques]. Direct observation was used to 
collect additional information and, where appropriate, to verify information                                                                                                                                                                            
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provided in interviews. In total, 27 interviews were conducted with 
community members (including village and commune council members, the 
community fishery committee, fishing households and fish traders), and a 
number of discussions were held with external stakeholders (DOF, POF and 
OCAA staff). Data reviewed included internal reports and policy documents 
compiled by the Cambodian government, international NGOs and 
governmental donors (including WorldFish, Mekong Research Commission, 
Oxfam and DFID), in addition to published data. 
The term co-management encompasses a wide range of possible decision-
making arrangements; these can be classified in a number of ways. The 
type of co-management regime in place is determined by the aspirations 
and capabilities of co-management partners, and the most appropriate type 
of arrangement depends on the specific characteristics of an individual 
fishery (Sen and Nielsen 1996). Types of co-management developed by Sen 
and Nielsen (1996) (instructive, consultative, co-operative, advisory, and 
informative) were used to identify the type of co-management arrangement 
in place in the Tblong Kla community fishery. Although classifying a 
co-management arrangement as one specific ‘type’ is somewhat artificial 
(different management tasks may be classified as different types) and static 
(co-management evolves over time and is likely to change), it does provide 
a clear snapshot of the regime in place, sets it in the context of other co-
management arrangements, and helps to determine its appropriateness to 
the fishery. 
Conditions for successful co-management
An institution that manages a common pool resource (CPR) is generally 
regarded as successful if its operation is defined as being efficient, equitable 
and sustainable (although there a various ways of interpreting whether these 
outcomes are met), or more simply, as ‘durable’ (Agrawal 2001). Significant 
research has been conducted to identify the types of institutions able to 
manage CPRs successfully. Ostrom was one of the first researchers to 
identify the characteristics of robust, long-enduring institutions managing 
CPRs (Ostrom 1990), although several authors, including Wade (1988) and 
Baland and Platteau (1996), have identified key conditions, and, to date, at 
least 30 different conditions have been identified (Agrawal 2001). CHAPTER 3 | Theory and methods used 15
                                                                                                                                                                           
In any given situation, successful management will depend on 
characteristics of the resource and of the resource user (Dietz et al. 2002), 
and no one design will ensure the success of all types of CPR (Stern et 
al. 2002). Key conditions for successful co-management of fisheries in 
Asia have been identified from an analysis of many case studies (Pomeroy 
et al. 2001). Many of the conditions reflect similarities with design 
principles illustrated by long-enduring CPR institutions (Ostrom 1990) and 
characteristics encouraging the establishment of institutions to manage 
CPRs (Ostrom 1992). While successful co-management does not always 
require all conditions to be satisfied, generally, the greater number of 
conditions that are met, the greater the chance of co-management success 
(Pomeroy et al. 2001). 
Conditions affecting the success of co-management apply at three different 
levels the supra-community, community and individual levels (Pomeroy 
et al. 2001). At the supra-community level, key success factors are the 
existence of enabling policy that defines use rights to the fishery, and of 
an external agent of change to initiate the co-management process. At the 
community level, boundaries, user group membership, property rights, and 
management objectives all need to be clearly defined, while local leadership, 
government support, community participation and sustained financial 
resources are considered essential to success. Finally, at the individual level, 
there need to be incentives for participants to weigh costs against benefits. 
The conditions were identified in the context of Asian fisheries (both coastal 
and inland), and many were found to be relevant to small-scale fisheries in 
Cambodia. In this research, the conditions were used to identify constraints 
to co-management performance in the Tblong Kla community fishery, and 
thus to explain current success (or lack of success), and to direct policy 
recommendations. The presence and absence of ‘success conditions’, along 
with current outcomes of management and the type of co-management 
arrangement in place, are discussed in the following section.                                                                                                                                                                           
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Analysis and results 4
Characteristics of the fishery and resource user community
7
he Tblong Kla village community fishery is located on the Mekong 
mainstream and is used by all members of the village, and by fishers 
from neighboring villages in the commune as well as outsider fishers. 
All fishers use similar small-scale gear (cast and gill nets, long lines and 
traditional bamboo traps). Production from the fishery consists of multi-
species mixed catches, and, on average, fishers catch 1.3-2.5 kg/day, with 
higher amounts in the dry season. Most of the species caught in the fishery 
undertake longitudinal and/or lateral migrations. 
Tblong Kla village is small and homogenous, with a high dependence on 
fishing. All households have dual livelihood strategies, farming rice for 
household consumption, and subsistence fishing. Sale of fresh fish to a 
commercial trader based in the provincial capital represents the main source 
of household income, as there is restricted access to market for other goods. 
Institutional arrangements
The community fishery represents a management partnership between 
the community and the POF supported by the NGO (Oxfam Community 
Aid Abroad). Within the community, the organization is represented by 
the community fishery committee (CFC), which consists of five elected 
community members. The CFC meets regularly with the POF and OCAA; 
meetings involving the entire community are less frequent. 
The rules of the community fishery prohibit fishing with ‘illegal’ gear 
(including electro-fishing, bombing and large mesh nets), and any fishing 
within the deep pool conservation zone. Sanctions for breaking this rule are 
gear confiscation and fines for illegal gear use (imposed by the POF), and 
verbal warnings for fishing in the deep pool. All members of the community 
are responsible for monitoring, while enforcement is the responsibility of the 
CFC, commune leader and police, and POF. 
External institutional arrangements
Management of all fisheries in Cambodia is the responsibility of the MAFF, 
through the DOF. The DOF operates from a central base and through 
provisional offices (located in all provincial capitals) and district fisheries 
officers. Within the DOF, the community fisheries development office 
(CFDO) is responsible for facilitating the establishment of community                                                                                                                                                                            
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fisheries. Currently, community fisheries are officially recognized by the 
POF and DOF, but do not have any legal right to create new laws. Therefore, 
rules created by the community fishery mirror existing national fisheries 
law (such as the prohibition of illegal fishing gear) and may be reinforced 
by voluntary agreements amongst members (such as not fishing in the deep 
pool conservation zone).
Outcomes of co-management 
Outcomes of co-management are assessed in terms of the degree to which 
management objectives are met, as well as in terms of specific performance 
indicators (equity, efficiency and sustainability). It should be mentioned that 
here we focus predominantly on perceived, rather than actual, management 
performance, and thus the assessment is somewhat subjective. 
Degree to which management objectives are being met
The main management objectives for community members, the CFC and the 
POF (defined in Table 3) are to conserve fish stocks and maintain consistent 
catches by limiting fishing effort; to control the use of illegal gear and; 
to protect fish spawning grounds. However, management objectives for 
community members also include increasing future catches and restricting 
outsiders from the fishery. The main objectives for OCAA are food security 
for community members and empowerment of the community to manage 
the fishery.
B a s e do nc o m m u n i t ym e m b e r s ’a n de x t e r n a ls t a k e h o l d e r s ’p e r c e p t i o n so f
management performance (Table 4), it appears that currently some, but not
a l l ,m a n a g e m e n to b j e c t i v e sa r eb e i n gm e t .F i r s t ,t h ec o m m u n i t yf i s h e r yh a s
c a u s e das i g n i f i c a n td e c r e a s ei ni l l e g a lf i s h i n g .A w a r e n e s sa n du n d e r s t a n d i n g
o fs t o c kc o n s e r v a t i o na n dt h er o l eo ft h ed e e pp o o lh a sa l s ob e e nr a i s e d ,a n d
capacity-building has gone some way to empowering community members
to manage the fishery. However, all those interviewed reported a decrease
i ni n d i v i d u a lf i s hc a t c h e so v e rt h el a s tf i v ey e a r s( s i n c et h ec r e a t i o no ft h e
c o m m u n i t yf i s h e r y ) ,a n da ni n c r e a s ei nt h en u m b e ro ff i s h e r s ,p a r t i c u l a r l y
o u t s i d e r s ,u s i n gt h ef i s h e r y .A d d i t i o n a l l y ,f i s hs p a w n i n gg r o u n d s( i . e . ,t h e
deep pool) are not effectively protected, as fishing in the deep pool is 
believed to occur quite frequently. As a result, food and income security is 
currently not being achieved, and while community members can generally
catch sufficient fish for daily household consumption, there is little certainty 
that this will continue in the future. Catches are also somewhat uncertain                                                                                                                                                                            
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Table 4. Stakeholder perceptions of community fishery achievements
Stakeholder Achievements of the community fishery 
(Number of households mentioning each achievement)
Community members Decreased illegal fishing (still some electro-fishing) (15)*
Raised awareness about fish conservation (10)
Brought people in community together (6)
Raised awareness about fishing law and management (5)
Few benefits for community (4)
Community Fishery 
Committee
Decreased illegal fishing 
Defined conservation area 
Trained committee in management
Raised awareness of community fishery organization in community 
Defined gear restrictions (though rules not yet in use)
Provincial Fisheries Office Decreased illegal fishing 
Decreased fishing in deep pools 
Oxfam Community Aid 
Abroad
Decreased illegal fishing 
Created community fishery rules
Built capacity within community and committee
Not possible to increase fish stocks until community has greater power to 
control illegal fishing completely and regulate access to community fishery
Base (community members’ responses): 27 interviews with ﬁshing households, ﬁsh traders and other key people
Table 3. Stakeholder objectives
Stakeholder Objectives for community fishery
(Number of households mentioning each objective)
Community members Limit amount of gear used in the fishery (11)*
Fish conservation and protection of fish stock (10)
Control illegal fishing (9)
Increase fish catches in future (8)
Control outside fishers (5)
Protect deep pool and fish breeding grounds (4)





Protect fish breeding grounds and endangered fish species
Provincial Fisheries 
Office
Conserve and increase fish stock to achieve sustainable production
Decrease occurrence and improve monitoring of illegal fishing
Ban fishing in deep pools 
Limit fishing effort by limiting amount and size of gear 
Enable the community to manage the fishery and control fishing
Raise awareness and understanding of conservation 
Oxfam Community Aid 
Abroad
Food security: ensure all community members can catch sufficient fish for 
household consumption 
Empowerment: ensure all community members have an equal and effective say 
in management decisions 
 Base (community members’ responses): 27 interviews with ﬁshing households, ﬁsh traders and other key people                                                                                                                                                                           
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(fishers may catch nothing on some days), and not all households catch a 
sufficient amount to regularly process fish and thereby create the preserved 
stores of fish needed for food security. Although community members 
generally believe the community fishery will help conserve fish stocks 
for the future, current stock status is unknown and so it is not possible to 
determine whether the objective of conserving fish stocks is being met to 
any extent. 
Performance measures
Table 5. Stakeholder perceptions of rule compliance
Rules Perceived level of compliance and reasons 
Community member perceptions 
Illegal fishing
Fishing in deep pool
Most community members comply 
See link between decreasing fish production and illegal fishing 
Afraid of being caught and fined 
Own no illegal gear 
Some outsiders do not comply 
‘Powerful’ individuals – bribe/intimidate CFC and POF
Want to catch as much fish as possible (not concerned with stock 
conservation)
Some community members comply with rule
Follow regulations
Pool too deep to use nets/traps
Want to protect dolphins (sacred)
Some community members do not comply
Good place to catch big fish
Know they can get away with it (no sanctions)
Few other places to fish during dry season 
If they see others fishing in deep pool likely to join them
Outsiders do not comply
Don't see reason to comply 
Want to catch as much fish as possible (not concerned with stock 
conservation)
Not aware of regulations 
Community Fishery Committee 
perceptions
Illegal fishing
Fishing in deep pool
Ten outsiders given warnings for using illegal gear (large mesh nets) 
since community fishery creation
Three outsider boats known to use illegal fishing gear still fishing in 
area 
No community members caught fishing within deep pool 
conservation area 
Few outsiders caught and cautioned
Provincial Fisheries Office 
perceptions
Illegal fishing
Fishing in deep pool
Still some electro-fishing and use of large mesh nets by outsiders 
Still some stream-blocking and use of large mesh nets by community 
members 
Some fishing in the deep pool by outsiders and community members
Community members make voluntary agreements to abide by 
regulations 
Outsiders may not even be aware of regulations                                                                                                                                                                           
20 WorldFish Center |Development of Fisheries Co-management in Cambodia: A case study and its implications
2   Outcomes of management are considered in terms of equity, efﬁciency and sustainability, although it should be noted that 
assessing performance on these indicators is highly subjective and open to wide interpretation. 
Based on the perceptions of community members and on direct observations 
at the study site, it is possible to draw some broad conclusions in terms 
of performance measures.2 First, management is more equitable as a 
result of co-management; this is demonstrated by increased community 
participation, understanding and empowerment. Furthermore, management 
is also providing a better stewardship role, as illegal fishing has 
decreased. It is unclear, however, whether or not co-management has 
increased sustainability of the fishery. Local fishers perceive that catches 
have declined over recent years and have remained low despite the co-
management initiative. However, comparative data suggest that the total 
yield achieved in the fishery is high; they do not support the perception that 
productive capacity has been degraded (Cookson 2004). Likewise, analysis 
of the catch size (i.e., fish length measurement) of key species indicates that 
only the largest-sized species are likely to be overfished. Hence, there is 
little evidence that current exploitation levels are unsustainable, nor that co-
management has positively affected the status of the resource. 
Patterns of interaction 
Interactions between resource users and the fishery, reflected in rule 
compliance and enforcement, influence the co-management process. 
Currently, there is fairly low compliance with the rule prohibiting fishing 
in the deep pool, but high compliance with the rule banning illegal fishing 
gear (Table 5). Illegal electro-fishing occurs at low levels, carried out 
by a few outsiders and ‘powerful’ individuals (who are considered to 
escape punishment by fishing at night or through the use of bribes and 
intimidation), but overall the rule is quite well enforced. Likewise, illegal 
large mesh nets are used to a small extent, mainly by outsiders, and often 
in the deep pool area. In contrast, enforcement of the ban on fishing in the 
deep pool is low; few sanctions have been issued and there is little active 
monitoring by community members.
Community cooperation with and contribution to co-management is quite 
low. Although the community fishery committee holds regular meetings 
with external stakeholders, meetings about the fishery that involve the entire 
community are infrequent (the last being held two years ago). Additionally, 
there is little active monitoring of fishing in the deep pool by community 
members.                                                                                                                                                                           
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Incentives to comply and cooperate with co-management
Use of illegal fishing gear
Fishing with illegal gear, such as electro-fishing, yields much larger catches 
than does legal gear (30–40 kg/day in comparison with 1.3–2.5 kg/day); 
there is, therefore, a strong incentive for its use. However, electro-fishing 
is considered unacceptable by community members because it is perceived 
to have depleted fish stocks in the past, resulting in low current catches. 
Community members feel some sense of ownership towards the fishery 
and believe that it is in their interest to secure future stock levels. There 
is an understanding that fish stocks need to ‘recover’ and that catch 
amounts should be limited. Consequently, electro-fishing is not used by 
community members and is closely monitored. Some fishers report that any 
community member known to use illegal gear is shunned by other villagers. 
Additionally, electro-fishing gear is very expensive, making it out of the 
reach of almost all villagers, and therefore not an option.
Within the community, it is generally recognized that large mesh nets are 
particularly harmful to fish stocks because they target larger, spawning 
fish. Preservation of spawning fish was generally considered to be one of 
the most important ways of maintaining fish stocks; because of this, most 
community members see an incentive to follow the rule banning large mesh 
nets, and their use is highly monitored. However, while it is recognized that 
spawning fish should be preserved to help maintain stocks, they are also a 
highly prized and valuable product of the fishery. 
Fishing in the deep pool
The deep pool is recognized as an important spawning ground and dry 
season refuge, and there is some belief that protecting the deep pool will 
lead to an increase in fish productivity. Fishing in the deep pool is very 
easy to monitor, as the area is highly visible and located close to the village 
centre. Therefore, high rule compliance might be expected. However, the 
deep pool is considered to be one of the most productive areas in the 
community fishery. Several fishermen stated that they find it quite difficult 
to catch fish in other areas and, consequently, have no choice but to fish in 
the deep pool, in order to catch sufficient amounts. Additionally, individuals 
are reluctant to give up fishing in the deep pool while others continue to do 
so.                                                                                                                                                                            
22 WorldFish Center |Development of Fisheries Co-management in Cambodia: A case study and its implications
Compliance with future rules 
While the current operational rules of the community fishery do not limit 
access or the amount of gear used, these issues are covered in proposed 
future rules. A number of incentives exist for community members, but 
not outsiders, to comply with and participate in enforcement of these rules. 
First, community members all use a similar amount of fishing gear, which 
generally allows them to catch enough for subsistence consumption plus 
a little extra income. Any gear restriction would therefore have a small 
and fairly uniform impact on all community members. However, outsiders 
(according to community members’ perceptions) tend to use more gear (in 
addition to fishing for longer) and consequently catch more fish. Secondly, 
although the community fishery is open-access, community members feel 
they have more ‘right’ to fish there than outsiders. Conversely, outsiders 
do not have any ‘ownership’ of the fishery, and see little incentive to limit 
current fishing effort to protect future stock. Rather, it is in their interest to 
maximize catches in the short term.
Co-operating with the co-management process
Currently, there are few incentives for community members to participate 
with and contribute to the community fishery. Community members are 
reluctant to invest time and effort in it because they see no tangible benefits. 
They recognize that illegal fishing has decreased—and many attribute this 
to the establishment of the community fishery—but they note that, despite 
this, individual catches have declined over time. Consequently, they perceive 
few benefits from co-management because it is not yet achieving one of their 
main objectives—that is, increased or sustained catches.
One of the main incentives for the government to engage in co-management 
is that it delivers a means of improving compliance with fishing regulations, 
and, thereby, achieving sustainable productivity in the fishery. Prior to 
the development of the community fishery, levels of compliance were 
very poor; there were high levels of illegal fishing and minimal awareness 
or enforcement of the ban on fishing in the deep pool. The community 
fishery potentially offers the government a low-cost and effective means of 
improving compliance with both rules, although currently only compliance 
with the ban on illegal gear is being achieved. The community fishery is also 
supported by an external NGO donor (OCAA), which further reduces the 
requirement for government funding.                                                                                                                                                                           
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In terms of the five types of co-management proposed by Sen and Nielsen 
(1996), the co-management arrangement in Tblong Kla village community 
fishery is best described as co-operative, although the type varies with 
tasks, as Table 6 shows. Co-management becomes less resource-user 
based, the higher the level of decision-making. Local users have quite 
a lot of responsibility for management decisions at the operational level. 
Management tasks, including resource estimation, monitoring, control 
and enforcement, are jointly undertaken by resource users and the 
POF, and operational rules are jointly developed by both. The original 
planning process for co-management can also be considered to have been 
co-operative, as both partners played a role in the decision to create the 
community fishery, a process that was coordinated by an NGO acting as 
an intermediary between community and government partners. However, 
at higher decision-making levels (e.g. policy formulation), management 
decisions are primarily the responsibility of the government, with 
little input from resource users. At this level, co-management can be 
considered as instructive. Similarly, in the wider context, implementation 
of co-management in Cambodia could be more accurately described as 
consultative or instructive. The development of community fisheries is 
being promoted by central government (as part of new fisheries policy 
aimed at improving food security for the rural poor) in a top-down approach. 
Although resource users have some say in whether or not to start a 
community fishery organization, they do not play an equal co-operative role 
in co-management design or implementation.
Currently, the capabilities and aspirations of the community are conducive 
to co-operative co-management; an established community-based user 
group promotes empowerment of resource users and participation in the 
management process. However, lack of boundaries and lack of control 
over access limit the role resource users can effectively play in certain 
management activities (e.g. resource users do not have responsibility for 
controlling the level of exploitation in the fishery), and prevents more 
Table 6. Types of co-management arrangement in place for different management tasks
Management task Type of co-management arrangement
Operational level tasks Co-operative
Rule creation Co-operative/consultative
Planning and implementation Consultative/instructive
Co-management design Instructive                                                                                                                                                                           
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resource user involvement in co-management. Additionally, the current 
political and social environment is not conducive to the domination of 
resource users in fishery management, although capacity-building efforts 
by OCAA have been attempting to change this. Traditionally, governance in 
Cambodia has been fairly authoritarian, and individuals are unaccustomed 
to having much say in the management of natural resources. State 
administration is highly bureaucratic, following a hierarchy of national, 
provincial, district, commune and village levels in management decision-
making and implementation. 
Based on this assessment, the type of management regime currently in 
place (cooperative co-management) seems to be the most appropriate given 
the physical features of the fishery and the capabilities of the resource 
users. However, this may (and indeed should) change as constraints to 
management are addressed, as greater control is devolved to the community 
and as capacity-building efforts, led by OCAA, increase the capabilities 
and confidence of community members in managing the resource. Factors 
affecting the direction of change are further discussed in section 5.
Presence of co-management success conditions
A number of the factors identified by Pomeroy et al. (2001) as promoting 
successful co-management were found to be present in the Tblong Kla 
community fishery (Table 7). Importantly, there is evidence of an external 
agent of change, long-term government support, and incentives for 
individuals to participate in the process. However, this assessment also 
revealed that many other conditions are absent or only partially present. As 
a result, co-management performance is limited. 
Conditions promoting co-management
First, the community fishery was initiated and is supported by an NGO 
partner (OCAA), which can be considered an ‘external agent of change’. 
OCAA helped the community define the problem (high levels of illegal 
fishing and declining individual catches), and provided ideas for a 
solution (creation of the community fishery). OCAA further assists the co-
management process with awareness-raising and management training in 
the community, and with support to the government partner in the form of 
training and funding for POF staff. While OCAA provides support to enable 
the community to make decisions (e.g. rule creation), it does not directly                                                                                                                                                                            
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Table 7. Presence of co-management ‘success conditions’ in the Tblong Kla community fishery
Condition Present Current status 
1 Enabling policy and legislation No Community Fishery sub-decree not yet passed.
2 External agent of change  Yes NGO very much involved.
3 Appropriate scale and defined 
boundaries
No Scale doesn’t represent ecosystem and 
boundaries poorly defined. No exclusion or clear 
rights of ownership.
4 Clearly defined membership No Members of community living in village included 
but other users of resource not included.
5  Group homogeneity  To some 
extent
High level of homogeneity between community 
members (and members of other villages within 
commune). 
Community members and outside fishers less 
homogeneous.
6 Participation by all affected in 
management decisions
No All community members participate but other 
users of resource not included.
7 Appropriate local leadership Yes Elected committee of community members.




NGO support to increase capacity and 
community participation, but empowerment 
limited as little transfer of power to community.
9 Community organization Yes Active community fishery committee.
10 Long-term support of local 
government
Yes POF involvement and support.
11 Property rights over the resource No Officially state property but effectively open-
access.
12 Adequate and sustained financial 
resources
No Currently funded by NGO (no sustained funding).
13 Community ownership of co-
management process
Yes But quite weak (considered to ‘belong’ to CFC 
and NGO). 
14 Accountability Yes Committee members elected by community, 
and process regularly evaluated by NGO.
15 Conflict management mechanism No Conflicts between users rare, but no distinct 
management mechanism. 
16 Clear objectives Yes Clear, but not all objectives are realistic, and 
different stakeholders have different objectives.




Rule prohibiting fishing in deep pool poorly 
enforced. Prohibition of illegal fishing better 
enforced. 
18 Individual incentive structure Yes Incentives for government and resource users to 
participate in co-management exist.
Source: Pomeroy et al. (2001)                                                                                                                                                                           
26 WorldFish Center |Development of Fisheries Co-management in Cambodia: A case study and its implications
participate, and can therefore be considered to fulfill the role of ‘catalyst’, 
rather than co-management partner. 
Secondly, there is some evidence of fairly long-standing cooperation 
between government and local co-management partners. This is 
demonstrated by the fact that monitoring is undertaken by community 
members, rule-breakers are apprehended by the CFC and commune police, 
and sanctions are issued by POF staff. Additionally, the community should 
(in theory) receive 50% of fines collected by the POF from fishers caught 
using illegal gear within the community fishery. This would, in theory, 
encourage further cooperation and responsibility-sharing between partners, 
and provide an additional incentive for the community to participate in 
law enforcement. However, members of the community do not have any 
power to directly enforce rules of the community fishery, and reliance on 
government authorities undermines the perceived power of the organization 
to some extent. Additionally, this enforcement structure could be viewed as 
a continuation of top-down management with community-based monitoring, 
rather than true co-operative co-management. 
Thirdly, an incentive structure encouraging individual co-management 
partners to participate exists to some extent. At the community level, a 
number of incentives exist. These include lack of property rights and 
representation, declining individual catches and the fact that the catches of 
community members are smaller than those of outsiders and illegal fishers. 
Additionally, poverty, high dependence on fishing, and lack of opportunities 
to leave the village, both currently and in the future, are incentives to 
manage the fishery in a more sustainable manner. 
Co-management has been endorsed and is actively promoted by central 
government, and current fishing policy (e.g. the government’s 10-year 
plan) promotes community fisheries as a key management tool. Therefore, 
the government has a strong incentive for co-management to succeed 
in community fisheries, and is likely to support the process. Incentives 
for government to take part in co-management include the threat of 
overexploitation and unsustainability in the fishery, poor levels of 
compliance with regulations, and the lack of resources for monitoring, 
control and enforcement under top-down management. The promotion of co-
management by an external donor offers a further incentive for government 
participation in the process.                                                                                                                                                                            
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Other conditions that promote co-management include the presence 
of an accountability mechanism, local leadership and a community 
organization. In terms of accountability, the co-management process is 
monitored to some extent by the involvement of OCAA, which conducts 
regular project evaluations. Although the NGO cannot be considered to 
be completely neutral (in initiating and supporting the community fishery 
they have a vested interest in its success), it is unlikely to be influenced by 
corruptive forces. Additionally, OCAA remains somewhat external to the 
co-management process because it does not participate or greatly influence 
actual management decisions. However, currently, there is no legal 
documentation of accountability (such as a management plan or agreement) 
within the CFC or between co-management partners. 
Local leadership is represented quite clearly by the CFC, which is made 
up of elected community members. The CFC appears to fulfill its 
intended role of providing direction and assuming responsibility for initial 
implementation of co-management. Leadership skills have been developed 
through capacity-building initiatives led by OCAA. Likewise, the CFC 
clearly represents a community organization that is formally recognized 
by way of its registration with the POF. In theory, the community fishery 
has the potential to influence the direction of local policy and decision-
making, demonstrated by the decision to actively protect the deep pool by 
the creation of a conservation zone. In the future (under the community 
fisheries sub-decree), community fisheries should have some power to 
impose gear, temporal and spatial restrictions in the form of locally created 
bylaws (which will be subject to approval by the POF). 
Constraints to successful co-management 
Most importantly, property rights to the fishery are not clearly defined 
or assigned to resource users.3 The fishery is still under open-access 
management and, crucially, local resource users have no greater right to the 
resource than outsiders. As Pomeroy et al. (2001) state, without property 
rights it is difficult to greatly change user attitude and behavior towards 
conservation. Villagers perceive catches to be declining over time and 
understand that limiting fishing effort could lead to a recovery in stocks. 
3   There are examples of successful co-management arrangements occurring within the context of all types of property rights 
regimes, including state property (Jentoft et al. 1998). However, management rights have generally been delegated to the 
deﬁned resource-user group, which then has the power to limit access to the resource.                                                                                                                                                                            
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However, there has been little change in behavior since creation of the 
community fishery. This is because community members are reluctant to 
decrease their own fishing effort unless other users (including outsiders) 
decrease theirs. 
All inhabitants of Tblong Kla village have similar rights to fish in the 
fishery and to participate in management decisions. However, other 
fishers (members of other villages in the commune and outsiders) are not 
included as members of the community fishery. Additionally, there is little 
homogeneity between community members and outsiders. These latter 
come from other areas, have greater reliance on fishing, and appear to fish 
more intensively. 
Another crucial factor limiting management success is the lack of relevant 
enabling legislation. Currently, the community fishery can create rules, but 
the scope is limited to gear restrictions and no-take areas, and it has no 
power to control access. Rules created by the community fishery depend on 
the POF or other institutions, such as the commune police, for enforcement. 
Consequently, there is little transfer of power to resource users. The future 
community fishery sub-decree will recognize community fisheries as 
legitimate institutions with rights to manage the resource; this may raise the 
Tblong Kla community fishery’s profile and lead to better enforcement of 
management rules. 
Although management objectives for the fishery have been clearly 
defined, there are two main problems. First, different stakeholders have 
slightly different objectives for the community fishery. The objectives 
of OCAA concentrate on food security, the POF is primarily concerned 
with controlling illegal fishing and making the fishery sustainable, while 
community members aim to sustain or increase individual catches. While 
objectives are broadly similar, they do not appear to have been developed 
jointly. Additionally, objectives such as increasing fish production are 
not easily attainable under current management and exploitation levels. 
Unattainable objectives risk leading to disillusionment and lack of 
ownership in the co-management process. 
Another constraint to management relates to the physical boundaries to the 
resource (which are indistinct) and the scale (which is not very appropriate). 
Furthermore, the most appropriate scale varies with ecosystem and 
management boundaries. The physical characteristics of the fishery do not 
lend themselves well to a small-scale co-management arrangement. For                                                                                                                                                                            
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example, while physical boundaries to a riverine fishery can be defined 
in theory, it is difficult to do so in practice. Perhaps more importantly, the 
community fishery does not reflect a natural ecosystem; it is not a discrete 
waterbody, but a small portion of the Mekong mainstream, and fish are in 
no way restricted by its boundaries. At least half of the predominant species 
undertake longitudinal migrations, and therefore the fishery represents only 
one seasonal habitat. Attempts to conserve fish by limiting effort within 
the community fishery are unlikely to be effective if there are no similar 
controls in the local and (for migratory species) wider area. 
Additionally, although the community fishery is currently funded by 
an NGO, there are no sustained financial resources to support future 
management and enforcement. Community members have not made any 
financial investment in the community fishery, and the only potential 
funding from the POF (50% of fines collected for illegal gear use in the 
community fishery) represents a fairly unreliable source of income. 
Overall, the sense of ownership of the community fishery is quite low 
amongst community members, and this probably also hinders the co-
management process (e.g. it results in minimal monitoring of fishing in 
the deep pool). One reason for the lack of ‘ownership’ amongst community 
members may be that objectives for the community fishery were not jointly 
developed by all stakeholders. Additionally, corruption within the fishery 
(use of illegal gear by individuals in positions of power, fish trading during 
the closed season, and obstruction of law enforcement through intimidation 
or bribery) undermines the co-management process, and makes the 
establishment of trusting relationships more difficult. 
Finally, there is no specific arrangement for the management of conflict 
within the fishery (although conflict management mechanisms exist within 
the community generally). This is not currently seen as a constraint to 
the co-management process as, due to the relative lack of activity and 
enforcement within the community fishery to date, few conflicts have 
occurred, and there has consequently been little need for a conflict 
resolution mechanism. 
Having discussed the type of co-management arrangement in place, the 
current outcomes of management, and factors constraining success in 
management in the Tblong Kla community fishery, we turn now to the 
wider implications of these results for development of co-management in 
Cambodia.                                                                                                                                                                            
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Policy implications 5
O
verall, this assessment suggests that co-management is not currently 
functioning very successfully. Most importantly, introduction of 
co-management does not appear to have improved sustainability 
or productivity in the fishery. However, not all outcomes are negative; co-
management is achieving some of its objectives, including improved equity 
and community empowerment. Additionally, co-management is still being 
implemented and it may be premature to judge management performance as 
failing at this stage. Nonetheless, several important constraints limiting the 
success of co-management have been identified, and these apply generally 
to co-management in Cambodian fisheries. They include lack of boundaries 
and lack of access control, poorly defined property rights, lack of enabling 
legislation, and somewhat unrealistic objectives. They are not easy issues 
to address, but a number of measures could be initiated to improve 
management performance. 
Improving management in community fisheries
Access boundaries and property rights
The community fisheries sub-decree will provide the enabling legal 
framework for co-management, thereby giving local resource users some 
rights to manage fisheries. However, as previously discussed, these rights 
are likely to be limited, and will do little to address the lack of resource 
boundaries. Assigning property rights to a defined group of users (such as, 
the community members in Tblong Kla village) would be one way to define 
access boundaries to the resource and to increase ownership and legitimacy 
of community fisheries. Alternatively, greater control of management rights 
(including access right) could be transferred to the community. However, 
either move raises the question of equity—whether or not it is fair to let 
one group of resource users have exclusive rights to a part of the river and 
deny access to other users (e.g. outsiders)4. Before this can be answered, it 
is necessary to obtain an understanding of the position and motivations 
of outsiders. Once this is done, outsiders should either be included in the 
management process or effectively excluded from the fishery. This will 
be of key importance, as failure to effectively exclude outsiders from co-
management arrangements can further weaken enforcement capability 
(Ahmed et al. 1997). Mitigation measures may need to be taken, in order to 
provide excluded fishers with other means of livelihoods, and/or incentives 
not to fish in the area. 
4   This question is similarly raised by Jentoft and McCay (1995), who identify the problem of deﬁning who can legitimately be 
included in a ‘resource user group’ in an assessment of co-management arrangements in ﬁsheries. CHAPTER 5 | Policy implications 31
                                                                                                                                                                           
The main reason why individual community members are not complying 
with the rule prohibiting fishing in the deep pool is that the immediate 
benefits of higher catches outweighs the costs of being caught and of the 
decline in future stocks. Short time-horizons are commonly associated 
with open-access fisheries. Addressing issues such as boundaries and 
access rights is likely to alter the incentive structure for resource users and 
therefore increase rule compliance. Clear demarcation of fishery boundaries 
and no-take areas, along with graduated sanctions, could also improve 
compliance. 
Scale
The conservation benefits of community fisheries are likely to be much 
greater if efforts are coordinated and focused on a wider scale. In terms 
of management efficiency, the village level is probably too small to 
effectively implement management strategies. The commune level may 
be more appropriate, and in this study many community members fish 
in the wider area of the commune fishing grounds.5 Likewise, fellow 
members of the commune are considered to have similar ‘rights’ to fish 
in the community fishery, while non-commune members are considered 
‘outsiders’. However, appropriate scale for a fisheries management regime 
may be the fish stock ecosystem boundaries (Jentoft and McCay 1995), and 
conservation objectives will undoubtedly be better met if the community 
fishery represents a discrete ecosystem. In practice, this would be difficult 
to implement, as exact ecosystem boundaries for any fish population in 
a riverine habitat are difficult to define. Catches in small-scale fisheries 
are almost always multi-species, and different species will have different 
ecosystem boundaries, particularly as many species undertake extensive 
migrations (the entire Lower Mekong Basin is obviously not an appropriate 
scale for a co-management arrangement). Nonetheless, coordinated efforts 
between adjacent community fisheries are likely to have a greater impact 
than isolated efforts and protected areas.
One solution to the problem of scale may be the establishment of a 
‘federation of management zones’, in which individual co-management 
arrangements are linked, share common conservation objectives and 
impose similar harvest controls. This has been achieved to some extent 
in nearby southern Lao PDR, where many environmental characteristics 
5   The CFs in Ou Mreah are in the process of establishing a commune collective (enforcing and monitoring cooperation 
between the four CFs in the commune).                                                                                                                                                                           
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and livelihood strategies are very similar to northern Cambodia. These co-
management arrangements represent a number of distinct co-management 
arrangements, each with individually created and adapted regulations, 
but all following the same overall framework. In terms of conservation, 
there seem to be synergistic and positive impacts if many communities 
independently take responsibility for fish stocks, particularly local migratory 
and sedentary species, in their individual areas of control (Baird 1999).
Setting objectives
While the objectives of different stakeholders in the Tblong Kla 
community fishery do not differ greatly, they have not been developed 
jointly. Discussion amongst stakeholder groups, in order to re-define a 
set of common objectives, would increase understanding amongst parties. 
Objective-setting in community fisheries should also involve local resource 
users and external partners, and objectives need to be realistic. If increasing 
productivity in the fishery were the main objective, total catch would need 
to be greatly reduced in order to allow stock recovery. However, sustaining 
rural livelihoods will be a more pertinent objective for small-scale fisheries, 
and this should be reflected in policy and practice. Reductions in fishing 
pressure are unlikely to increase total yield, but may well improve returns to 
effort (i.e. catch per unit of effort).
Financial support
Finally, co-management arrangements are unlikely to be sustained in the 
long term if they rely solely on NGO partners for financial support. An 
alternative means of funding administration and enforcement should be 
established, whether this be charging outsiders to use the fishery, reserving 
a portion of catch for community funds or imposing fines for non-
compliance. A requirement for users of the fishery to invest in management 
and, thereby, carry some of the costs of the system may have the added 
benefit of increasing legitimacy of the co-management arrangement 
(Karlsen 2001). 
Appropriateness of co-management
Co-management is generally assumed to be the best institutional model 
for a legitimate and robust management system in subsistence fisheries 
(Jentoft et al. 1998), although it is recognized that it is not necessarily 
the most appropriate approach for every case. Community fisheries in CHAPTER 5 | Policy implications 33
                                                                                                                                                                           
Cambodia represent a mixture of cooperative, consultative and instructive 
co-management, which is fairly appropriate to the current situation. For a 
number of reasons, co-management is probably also more appropriate than 
the alternative options of community-based, market-based or bureaucracy-
based management. 
First, the lack of physical boundaries to riverine fisheries makes policing 
access difficult, even if property rights have been clearly assigned. 
Government involvement can increase legitimacy, and some degree of 
government support is generally always required to impose effective
management regulations in such situations (Pomeroy et al. 2001). Secondly, 
management regimes without government involvement require a high level 
of community or individual management capacity. This study suggests 
that, while resource users are keen to participate in management, local 
capacity and aspirations are probably not sufficient for autonomous fisheries 
management. However, complete state management that would require 
greater resources than those available, is generally considered undemocratic, 
and, of course, has not proven effective in meeting management objectives 
in the past. Lastly, a market-based approach (e.g. individual transferable 
quotas or ITQs) is not well suited to a multi-species fishery where 
divisibility and targeting of individual species is difficult, and where certain 
species have a higher value than others when sold (Bjorndal and Munro 
1999). 
Future development of community fisheries
Co-management is an evolving process, and will adjust and change in 
response to internal and external events and factors. Future development of 
co-management will depend principally on three main factors: first, the long-
term goals for community fisheries; secondly, the degree of management 
responsibility granted to resource users; and thirdly, the extent to which 
external events shape change.
The long-term goals for community fisheries overall will obviously have an 
impact on the objectives of individual fisheries, and greatly affect how the 
fishery is managed. Small-scale fisheries in Cambodia function as part of 
a diversified, semi-subsistence livelihood strategy for rural communities. 
Ultimately, it could be argued that maintaining sustainable livelihoods is 
more relevant than improving sustainability in the fishery, and will best 
be achieved by promoting diversification as this will allow shocks and 
seasonal variation in food security to be better absorbed. Therefore, if the                                                                                                                                                                            
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main goal of community fisheries is promotion of rural livelihoods and 
food security, harvest and effort will need to be controlled to some extent, 
while equitable access and distribution of yield will be of key importance. 
Additionally, promotion of supplementary livelihood options, such as 
agriculture, aquaculture, tourism or forestry, can serve to reduce fishing 
pressure, while retaining the benefits of part-time fishing (Smith et al. 2005). 
Conversely, managing the resource to increase productivity is only likely to 
be worthwhile if there is specialization in fishing (i.e. the establishment of 
a commercial fishery). However, even stringent restrictions on effort, and 
tight control of access boundaries will not guarantee an increase in yield, 
unless the restrictions apply to all habitats of migratory species. 
Currently, community fisheries represent a mixture of co-operative 
and consultative co-management at the collective choice level, with 
higher management decisions being made principally by government (i.e. 
instructive co-management). If resource users are to be allowed greater 
management control, they need to be given enabling power, through both 
legislation and capacity-building activities, and have the desire to participate 
in co-management. The rights apportioned to resource users by the 
community fishery sub-decree will dictate the direction of change in terms 
of the type of co-management regime in place. It should be recognized that 
the greater the degree of responsibility transferred to resource users, the 
greater the say they will have in determining the direction of development. 
This will be dependent on and reflect local perceptions of the resource and 
its perceived value, as well as external factors. For example, if the resource 
is perceived principally as an income generator, rather than as a food source, 
increasing productivity in the fishery may become the most important 
objective for community members. 
External factors will also play a role in the development of community 
fisheries. First, population growth is likely to exert increasing pressure 
on small-scale fisheries in Cambodia. As the number of dependent users 
increases, individual catches (and catch per unit effort) are likely to decrease. 
One possible solution is to lower fishing pressure in the riverine capture 
fishery by developing additional or alternative fishing grounds. Pond or 
rice-field fisheries could be used for household consumption or to generate 
community funds. The presence of the fish trader also exerts pressure on 
the fishery by representing a continual market for fish and thereby attracting 
fishers to the area. As trading fish represents the main or only income CHAPTER 5 | Policy implications 35
                                                                                                                                                                           
generator for many fishing communities, the development of alternative 
livelihood options would seem the only feasible way of addressing this 
problem. For example, access to markets for other goods could play a key 
role in lessening dependence on fisheries for income generation. 
Although a successful co-management arrangement can address local 
threats and so help improve sustainability within the fishery, other factors 
are largely beyond the control of co-management arrangements in small-
scale fisheries. Often, successful co-management is dependent on the 
creation of external mechanisms for resource protection (Pinkerton 1989), 
in addition to local conditions. Agriculture development, flooded forest 
clearing and upstream water abstractions are likely to remain as threats 
to fishery resources, and need to be addressed at the basin level. On the 
wider global scale, increasing market integration and globalization will also 
affect the direction of co-management development. For example, if there 
is increasing need for cash income, subsistence fishing may no longer be a 
viable way of supporting rural livelihoods.                                                                                                                                                                            
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A
lthough there is the potential for successful co-management in 
Cambodian small-scale fisheries, it is currently limited by some 
important constraints. These include the lack of clearly defined 
enabling legislation, of property rights, of resource boundaries and 
of access control. Additionally, management objectives are, in some 
cases, inappropriate and there is little agreement among co-management 
partners, on whether the objective is improving sustainability in the 
fishery or maintaining rural livelihoods. Currently, the transaction costs 
of co-management outweigh the benefits to local resource users, although 
the introduction of co-management has improved democracy and equity 
with regards to decision-making and distribution of the resource. Unless 
there is successful integration of management initiatives over the entire 
ecosystem, co-management is unlikely to have any impact on biological 
sustainability in riverine fisheries. Additionally, increasing fishing pressure 
and external threats to productivity need to be addressed on a wider scale. 
Unless alternative livelihood options become available and more attractive 
than fishing to resource users, fishing pressure is likely to remain high, with 
resultant low catch per unit effort and low individual catches.
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